The proofs of Kleene, Chaitin and Boolos for Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem are studied from the perspectives of constructivity and the Rosser property. A proof of the incompleteness theorem has the Rosser property when the independence of the true but unprovable sentence can be shown by assuming only the (simple) consistency of the theory. It is known that Gödel's own proof for his incompleteness theorem does not have the Rosser property, and we show that neither do Kleene's or Boolos' proofs. However, we show that a variant of Chaitin's proof can have the Rosser property. The proofs of Gödel, Rosser and Kleene are constructive in the sense that they explicitly construct, by algorithmic ways, the independent sentence(s) from the theory. We show that the proofs of Chaitin and Boolos are not constructive, and they prove only the mere existence of the independent sentences.
Introduction
A constructive proof provides an algorithm for constructing the claimed object; a nonconstructive proof does not show the existence of that object algorithmically, even if sometimes an effective procedure might be hidden inside the details. A proof then is proved to be (essentially) non-constructive when one can show that there is no algorithm (computable function) which, given the assumptions (coded as input), produces the claimed object whose existence is demonstrated in the proof. Below, we will see one example of a (seemingly) non-constructive proof (namely, the proof of Kleene [12] for Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, stated below) which can be made constructive by unpacking some details; we will also see a couple of proofs (namely, the proofs of Boolos [2] and Chaitin [4] for Gödel's first incompleteness theorem) that are shown to be non-constructive, by proving the non-existence of any algorithm for computing the claimed object (namely, the true but unprovable sentence). The (First) Incompleteness Theorem (of Gödel [6] ) states that for a sufficiently strong RE theory T there exists a sentence ψ T in the language of T such that 1. the sentence ψ T is true (in the standard model of natural numbers); 2. if T is consistent then T ψ T ; 3. if T is ω-consistent then T ¬ψ T .
By a proof of the incompleteness theorem we mean a demonstration of the existence of such a sentence (ψ T ) for any given consistent and RE theory T that is sufficiently strong (to be made precise later). Such a proof witnesses the Rosser property ( [17] ) when the condition of ω-consistency can be replaced with (simple) consistency; that is to say that the condition 3 above can be replaced with the following condition 3 ′ . if T is consistent then T ¬ψ T .
Gödel's original proof [6] for his incompleteness theorem is constructive, i.e., given a (finite) description of a consistent RE theory (e.g. an input-free program which outputs the set of all the axioms of the theory) the proof exhibits, in an algorithmic way, a sentence which is true (in the standard model of natural numbers N) but unprovable in the theory. For the independence of this sentence from the theory (i.e., the unprovability of its negation in the theory) Gödel also assumes the theory to be ω-consistent; so if the theory is ω-consistent, then that (true) sentence is independent from the theory (see e.g. [21, 22] ). It turned out later that the simple consistency of the theory does not suffice for the independence of the Gödel sentence (from the theory) and the optimal condition (which is much weaker than ω-consistency) is the consistency of the theory with its own consistency statement ([8, Theorems 35, 36] ). Rosser's proof [17] for Gödel's first incompleteness theorem assumes only the simple consistency of the (RE) theory and constructs (algorithmically) an independent (and true) sentence. So, one can say that Gödel's proof does not have the Rosser property. Here, we will see that while a variant of the proof of Chaitin has the Rosser property (i.e., the independence of Chaitin's sentence from the theory can be proved by assuming only the simple consistency of the theory), the proof of Boolos does not have the Rosser property (and the optimal condition for the independence of a Boolos sentence is the consistency of the theory with its own consistency statement).
Kleene's Proof for Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem
A very cute proof for Gödel's incompleteness theorem is that of Kleene (see e.g. [12, 21] ) which deserves more recognition. Notation 2.1 (Computability) Let ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , · · · be a list of all unary computable (partial recursive) functions (in a way that ϕ i (j), if it exists, can be computed from i and j). A recursively enumerable set (RE for short) is the domain of ϕ i , for some i ∈ N, which is denoted by W i . The notation ϕ i (j)↑ means that the function ϕ i is not defined at j, or j ∈ W i ; and ϕ i (j)↓ means that ϕ i is defined at j or j ∈ W i . Needless to say, ϕ i (j) = k means that ϕ i is defined at j and is equal to k. ✧ Robinson's Arithmetic is denoted by Q (see [24] or [21] ). In all the results of this paper, the theory Q can be replaced with a (much) weaker theory called R (see [24] ). The theory Q is finitely axiomatizable, while R is not.
Theorem 2.2 (Kleene's Theorem) For a given consistent and RE theory T that contains Q there exists some t ∈ N such that ϕ t (t)↑ but T "ϕ t (t)↑".
contradicting the consistency of T . Now, since T is RE then so is K T , while K is not an RE set because for any n we have n ∈ K ⇐⇒ n ∈ W n and so n ∈ K△W n , thus K = W n for all n. So, K T K; therefore, there must exist some t ∈ K − K T . For this t we have ϕ t (t)↑ but T "ϕ t (t)↑". ❑
Of course if T is sound (i.e., N |= T ) or even Σ 1 -sound (i.e., if σ ∈ Σ 1 and T ⊢ σ then N |= σ, cf. [8] ) then also T "ϕ t (t)↓", i.e., the sentence "ϕ t (t)↑" is (true and) independent from T . Let us note that the above proof did not explicitly specify t ∈ N.
for some t ∈ N which can be algorithmically computed from a description of the RE theory T . Now we show the truth of "ϕ t (t)↑" as follows:
(by the definition of W t ) Thus, t ∈ W t and so t ∈ K T whence T "ϕ t (t)↑". ❑ Indeed, for any RE and consistent theory T (⊇ Q) and any t with W t = K T we have (by the above proof) that ϕ t (t) ↑ and T "ϕ t (t) ↑ ". Below we show that Kleene's (constructive) proof does not have the Rosser property. Theorem 2.3 (Kleene's Proof is not Rosserian) For any given consistent and RE theory T ⊇ Q there exists an RE and consistent theory U ⊇ T such that U ⊢ "ϕ u (u)↓" for some u ∈ N which satisfies W u = {n ∈ N | U ⊢ "ϕ n (n)↑"} (and ϕ u (u) ↑).
Proof. There exists a computable (and total) function such that for any sentence ψ we have W (ψ) = {n ∈ N | T + ψ ⊢ "ϕ n (n)↑"}. By the Diagonal Lemma there exists a sentence λ such that Q ⊢ λ ↔ "ϕ (λ) (λ) ↓". Clearly, for the theory U = T + λ and
It remains to show that U is consistent: Otherwise, T ⊢ ¬λ and so T ⊢ "ϕ u (u)↑ " which implies that T + λ ⊢ "ϕ u (u)↑ " whence u ∈ W (λ) = W u . On the other hand T ⊢ "ϕ u (u)↑ " implies that ϕ u (u)↑ holds (since otherwise ϕ u (u)↓ by the Σ 1 −completeness would imply T ⊢ "ϕ u (u)↓" contradicting the consistency of T ) and so u ∈ W u ; a contradiction. ❑ Summing up, for any consistent and RE extension T of Q we have T "ϕ t (t)↑" and ϕ t (t)↑ for any t which satisfies W t = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ "ϕ n (n)↑"}. Moreover, if T is Σ 1 -sound then ϕ t (t)↑ is independent from T (i.e., we also have T "ϕ t (t)↓"). However, if the theory T is not Σ 1 -sound then for some e with W e = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ "ϕ n (n)↑ "} the sentence ϕ e (e)↑ might not be independent from T (and its negation could be provable in T , that is T ⊢ "ϕ e (e)↓"). Albert Visser has informed the authors that for any RE and consistent theory T which is sufficiently strong (see e.g. the explanations before Theorem 4.6 below) there exists some ϑ with W ϑ = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ "ϕ n (n)↑ "} such that (beside ϕ ϑ (ϑ)↑ and T "ϕ ϑ (ϑ)↑" we also have) T "ϕ ϑ (ϑ)↓", or in the other words the sentence ϕ ϑ (ϑ)↑ is independent from T ; moreover ϑ can be algorithmically computed from a given description of the RE theory T . The proof of this Rosserian version of Kleene's proof is rather involved and will appear in a future paper. Let us note that a Rosserian version of this beautiful theorem of Kleene appeared in [13] (see also [14] ) where Kleene calls it "a symmetric form" of Gödel's (incompleteness) theorem (also see [19] for a modern treatment).
Chaitin's Proof for Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem
There are various versions of Chaitin's proof for the incompleteness theorem [4] , which is sometimes called "Chaitin's incompleteness theorem"; this proof appears in e.g. [1, 5, 16, 23] . We consider the version presented in [1] .
The function K is total and for any e ∈ N there are finitely many m's which satisfy
The following is Lemma 7 of [1] .
Lemma 3.2 (Uncomputability of Complexity)
There is no computable function f which satisfies K f (m) > m for all m ∈ N.
Proof. If there were such a computable function f , then by Kleene's second recursion theorem there would exist some e such that ϕ e (x) = f (e) and so, ϕ e (0) = f (e) which implies K f (e) e; a contradiction. ❑ So, K is not computable, since otherwise f (x) = min{y | K (y) > x}, which satisfies ∀x : K f (x) > x, would be computable.
Theorem 3.3 (Chaitin's Theorem) For any consistent RE theory T which contains Q there exists a constant c T ∈ N such that for any e c T and any w ∈ N we have T "K (w) > e".
Proof.
If not, then for any given m ∈ N there exists some e m and some w such that T ⊢ "K (w) > e". Let us note that if T ⊢ "K (w) > e" for a consistent T ⊇ Q then K (w) > e, since otherwise, if K (w) e, the true Σ 1 -sentence "K (w) e" would be provable in Q (and so in T ) which contradicts the consistency of T . Now, for a given m we can, by an algorithmic proof search in T , find some e m and w such that T ⊢ "K (w) > e" (and so K (w) > e); our assumption guarantees the termination of this algorithm for any input m. Let f (m) be one of those w's; then K f (m) > e m which contradicts Lemma 3.2. ❑ This is an incompleteness theorem since for any c there are cofinitely many w's with K (w) > c. So, for a given T which is consistent and RE and contains Q there are cofinitely many w's such that the true sentences "K (w) > c T " are unprovable in T . As for the constructivity of this proof, the good news is that a constant c T which satisfies Chaitin's Theorem (3.3) can be algorithmically constructed from T .
Theorem 3.4 (Computing a Chaitin Constant) For a given consistent and RE extension T of Q one can algorithmically construct a constant c T such that for all e c T and all w, we have T "K (w) > e".
Proof. Given a description of a consistent, Σ 1 -complete and RE theory T the following can be done algorithmically. Define (x, y) to be the first ordered pair a, b such that the proof search algorithm of T shows up (a proof of) the sentence "K (a) > b x" (so,
. This is (a partially) computable (function) and an index of it can be calculated from (a description of) T . By Kleene c T " appears in the above mentioned proof search algorithm of T , then (c T , 0) = a, b and so ϕ cT (0) = 1 (c T , 0) = a. Thus, K (a) c T , and by the Theorem 3.5 (Non-Constructivity of Chaitin's Proof) There is no algorithm such that for a given consistent and RE extension T of Q can compute some w T such that both T "K (w T ) > c T " and K (w T ) > c T holds, where c T is a Chaitin constant as in Theorem 3.4.
Proof. If such a w T were computable from T , then the theory T ∞ = i∈N T i would be RE where T 0 = Q and inductively T i+1 = T i + "K (w Ti ) > c Ti " are defined by iterating the computation procedure. The theory T ∞ is also consistent (indeed, sound) and contains Q, so by Chaitin's Theorem (3.3) there should exist some constant c T∞ such that for no w can we have the deduction T ∞ ⊢ "K (w) > c T∞ ". But this is a contradiction because we have c Ti < c Ti+1 and also c Ti < c T∞ for all i ∈ N. ❑ Proof. (An Alternative Proof) Albert Visser suggested the following argument as another proof of Theorem 3.5: Since the sequence {c Ti } i∈N is strictly increasing, we have that c Tm m for any m ∈ N. Now, ∀m ∈ N : K (w Tm ) > c Tm m would contradict Lemma 3.2 if w T were computable from T . ❑ Remark 3.6 Albert Visser noted that Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 amusingly imply Lemma 3.2, since if there were a computable (total) function f with ∀m ∈ N : K f (m) > m then one could take w T as f (c T ). ✧
The true unprovable sentences "K (w) > e" (for e c T ) are also independent when T is a (Σ 1 -)sound theory: If T ⊢ "K (w) e" then the Σ 1 -sentence K (w) e has to be true, a contradiction. So, we restate Chaitin's Theorem as Corollary 3.7 (Chaitin's Theorem, restated) Let T be a Σ 1 -sound and RE theory such that T ⊇ Q. There exists some c T (which is computable from T ) such that for any e c T there are cofinitely many w's such that "K (w) > e" is independent from T . ❑ For a Rosserian version of Chaitin's Theorem the assumption of the "Σ 1 -soundness" (of T ) in Corollary 3.7 should be replaced with (its simple) "consistency". For doing that we need the following version of the Pigeonhole Principle in Q (which holds in R too).
Lemma 3.8 (A Pigeonhole Principle)
For any k ∈ N we have
Proof. This can be proved by induction (in the metalanguage) on k: for k = 0 it suffices to note that Q ⊢ ∀z¬(z < 0) and for the induction step it suffices to use the derivation
Theorem 3.9 (Rosserian form of Chaitin's Theorem) For any consistent RE extension T of Q there is a constant c T (which is computable from T ) such that for any e c T there are cofinitely many w's such that "K (w) > e" is independent from T .
Proof. By Chaitin's Theorem (3.3) there exists a constant c T (which is computable from T ) such that for any e c T there are cofinitely many w's such that "K (w) > e" is true but unprovable in T . Fix an e c T . For no w can T ⊢ "K (w) > e" hold, and T ⊢ "K (w) e" can hold for at most (e + 1)-many w's: if for some distinct w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w e+1 , the derivations
which contradicts Lemma 3.8 (for k = e + 1). Thus, for cofinitely many w's we should have both T "K (w) > e" and T "K (w) e". ❑
Martin Davis [5] calls
Chaitin's Theorem "a dramatic extension of Gödel's incompleteness theorem". We saw that this theorem as presented in Corollary 3.7 can be hardly considered an extension of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, as Gödel's proof is constructive while Chaitin's is not (Theorem 3.5). The Rosserian form of Chaitin's Theorem as presented in Theorem 3.9 could be considered as an extension of Gödel's and Chaitin's theorems in a sense, even though, it is not any more extension than Rosser's own [17] ; let us also note that Rosser's proof is constructive (while the proof of Theorem 3.9 is not).
Boolos' Proof for Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem
Jon Barwise calls it "a very lovely proof of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, probably the deepest single result about the relationship between computers and mathematics", and mentions that it is "the most straightforward proof of this result that I have ever seen" 1 . After its first appearance in [2] this proof was discussed, extended and studied in e.g. [9-11, 15, 18, 20] . 
and (b") ∀y < uDef <v T (y) hold. Now, by u n ∨ n u, if u = n then either u < n or n < u holds. In the former case we have a contradiction between (a") and (b'), and in the latter case we have a contradiction between (a') and (b"). Therefore, n = u. Now, assume (for the sake of contradiction) that
Thus, b T is definable in T by the formula Boolos T (x) whose length is less than ℓ T + len(5 · ℓ T ) + 9 = 4ℓ T + 26 < 5ℓ T (since, for any m, the term m = s(· · · (s (0) Proof. Assume that b T is computable from T , and let T 0 = Q and inductively
Define the function (n), for any n ∈ N, to be the maximum of m's such that ∀j < m : len("ϕ j (0) ↓= x") < n. This is a computable and non-decreasing function; also lim n (n) = ∞. So, from lim j ℓ Tj = ∞ we have lim j (5ℓ Tj ) = ∞. Therefore, for any (given) x one can compute some ι(x) such that (5ℓ T ι(x) ) > x. The proof will be complete when show that K (b Tj ) (5ℓ Tj ) holds for any j: Because, by the computability of b Tj from j, we will have a computable function
(5ℓ Tj ) holds for any j, we show more generally that for any u, v if ¬Def <v T (u) holds, for some consistent T ⊇ Q, then K (u) (v): If, to the contrary, we have K (u) < (v) then there exists some j such that (1) j < (v) and (2) ϕ j (0)↓= u. By (2) the number u is definable by the formula "ϕ j (0)↓= x" in Q (and so in T ), and by (1) the length of the formula "ϕ j (0)↓= x" is less than v; so Def (b T ), and so ¬Boolos T (b T ), could be provable in T . For the following theorem to make sense we note that for any theory U satisfying the following conditions (i) U Con(U ), i.e., Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem holds for U ;
(ii) U ⊢ Con(U + ψ) → Con(U ), for any ψ;
there exists a consistent theory S ⊇ U such that S + Con(S) is not consistent: The theory S = U + ¬Con(U ) is consistent by (i), and S ⊢ ¬Con(S) because S ⊢ ¬Con(U ) by the definition of S and S ⊢ ¬Con(U ) → ¬Con(S) by (ii). One example for a theory that satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii) above, and also (iii) in Theorem 4.6 and (iv) in Theorem 4.7 below, is Peano's Arithmetic. This arithmetic is indeed too strong and the finitely axiomatizable theory IΣ 1 (see [7] ) satisfies the conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). Even the weaker theories I∆ 0 + Ω 1 (see [25] ) and S 1 2 (see [3] ) are strong enough to satisfy them. ❑ Thus, the consistency of T + Con(T ) is an optimal (indeed, necessary and sufficient) condition for the independence of a Boolos sentence from T .
Concluding Remarks
The following Let us note that for the constructivity of a proof, usually, no new argument is needed as a computational procedure could often be seen from the proof. But the non-cosntructivity of a proof (as in the case of Chaitin's and Boolos' proofs) should be proved; proving the non-constructivity (the non-existence of any algorithm) is usually harder than showing the constructivity (the existence of an algorithm). So is having the Rosser property of a proof. Other than Rosser's proof and Kleene's symmetric theorem (1950) Chaitin's proof has the Rosser property. The non-Rosserian proofs of Gödel and Boolos need the consistency of T + Con(T ) for the independence of their true but unprovable sentences, and this condition, Con T + Con(T ) , is optimal (for the independence of that sentences).
